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q 201Contests over the control of information are central to the perpetuation and critique of militarism. This article
examines one of the most prominent sets of state document leaks in recent political history: the online posting of
hundreds of thousands of US war logs and diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks. Bold statements were advanced in 2010
and afterward regarding what these releases made visible. In contrast, this article considers how disclosure and
nondisclosure came bundled together. With reference to the tensions of keeping secrets and producing transparency,
I suggest that the promise attached to the released documents did not just derive from the argument that they
revealed modern statecraft, nor that such knowledge was tantalizingly out of reach, but from the manner in which
what had been rendered knowable could be revisited over time. Through this argument I want to explore the affective
knots, conceptual tangles, and problematic story lines associated with exposing militarism.The control of information is often regarded as central to the
continuance of militarism. As a result, much potential is typ-
ically invested in breaches of military and diplomatic secrecy,
and much allure can surround the exposure of military and
diplomatic activities. For those seeking to reveal the machina-
tions of militarism, the disclosure of once sequestered infor-
mation is often regarded as a vital basis for critique, whereas
for those working to defend military maneuvers from scrutiny,
information is often treated as a stockpile that needs to be
secluded. Given such investments, when breaches take place,
their meaning and relevance are often disputed.
This article examines the rhetoric and tensions of such con-
tests. It does so through considering one of the most prominent
instances of the unauthorized disclosure of information in re-
cent political history: the online posting of US war logs and
diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks. The intrigues of conflict have
long been a matter of dread, fascination, and enigma. As an or-
ganization dedicated to the anonymous online posting of cor-
porate and state documents, since its founding WikiLeaks has
sought to bring to the global population materials that were
previously only accessible to a limited coterie. As part of the
series of releases in 2010 examined in this article, WikiLeaks
collaborated with prominent newspapers to raise attention to
topics that could hardly be more significant for understanding
aspects of modern militarism centered on the United States:
thousands upon thousands of civilian deaths from conflict, a
new “Great Game” afoot, intelligence gathering on friend and
foe alike, and government participation in torture.Rappert is Professor in the Department of Sociology, Philoso-
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All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aThese leaks were widely billed as enabling a clear and some-
times unprecedented view into the workings of dimly lit cor-
ridors of power. The documents released provided not only the
building blocks for popular media accounts at the time about
how warfighting gets done but also subsequent academic schol-
arship setting out the nature of US information-gathering net-
works (e.g., Bicakci et al. 2014; Frampton and Rosen 2013) and
the inability of the US executive branch tomaintain the kinds of
tight information controls it sought (e.g., Fenster 2014).
If moving from the leaked documents to the truth was some-
times presented as a short step by members and supporters of
WikiLeaks, so too sometimes was moving from truth to power.
The “radical transparency” philosophy underpinningWikiLeaks
developed by its founder Julian Assange was premised on the
idea that freely disclosing material on the web in a manner not
controlled by entrenched institutions would challenge hierar-
chies of authority and therefore further democratic relations
(Sánchez Estop 2014). As many have argued, the leaked mate-
rial has been marshaled as part of efforts to create new relations
of democratic accountability (e.g., BBC Two 2012b; Sifry 2011).
Rather than using the leaks as an empirical resource for
grounding arguments about the realities of contemporary state-
craft, I take as my topic the issue of how the material was po-
sitioned. Stated differently, the focus is not somuch on what the
leaks tell us but, rather, the preliminary matter of how the logs
and cables were made to tell. Questions for consideration include:
How were the logs and cables put forward as (non-)revelatory
insights into US militarism? How did those organizations collab-
orating in the leaks attempt to advance themselves as authori-
tative interpreters of the logs and cables? Howwere claims to truth
reformulated over time? By examining these questions, we will
be able to explore the assumptions and commitments that often
inform (critical) analyses of militarism.served. 0011-3204/2019/60S19-00XX$10.00. DOI: 10.1086/700649
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S000 Current Anthropology Volume 60, Supplement 19, February 2019In making this argument, I take inspiration from anthro-
pological approaches that conceptualize keeping secrets as a
matter of analyzing how they get told—that is, who tells what,
when, to whom, and how (e.g., Bellmen 1981; De Jong 2007;
Taussig 1999). In other words, the focus is with the process of
secrecy rather than the content of secrets.
The structure is as follows: with a focus on Iraqi civilian
deaths, the next section elaborates how, as leaked secrets, the
logs and cables were often treated as possessing a readily ac-
cessible, self-evident, and definitemeaning. Importantly, though,
these were not the only orientations within news analyses by
those organizations under study in this article. As the third
section (“Stories behind the Stories”) details, treatments of the
logs and cables as accessible, evident, and definite in meaning
mixed and melded with reference to that which was not known,
towhat was inaccessible and not publicly appreciated, etc. These
evocations challenged the status of the logs and cables and un-
settled who could speak for them. A further notable feature
about theWikiLeaks revelations developed in the fourth section
(“Openings”) was that they were not just the topic of news
stories in 2010, but they have been subject to a series of “stories
behind the stories” by individuals central to the online postings.
Through books, films, and documentaries, these behind-the-
scenes accounts included commentary on what was missing in
the 2010 coverage of the leaks. Yet, this revisiting was not done
in such a way as to undermine the previous claims made by the
same commentators. Moving into more general analytical con-
siderations associated with the intertwining of concealment
and disclosure, the discussion section considers how the reve-
latory potential of the logs and cables was renewed over time by
collaborators.
The Presence of Leaks
In the years that followed WikiLeaks becoming a household
name, the composition, rationale, and history of the organiza-
tion would become contested between those (formerly) within
it as well as those outside of it. As basic background, though,
WikiLeaks was established in 2006 under the direction of Julian
Assange.While initially seeking to post hackedmaterials online,
it developed into an organization dedicated to publishing mate-
rials sourced from other parties (Beckett and Ball 2012). Wiki-
Leaks posted its first document in the year of its foundation.
This article, though, examines releases in 2010. During that year,
WikiLeaks released arguably its three most significant batches
of documents. The US National Security Advisor at the time of
the writing of this article previously characterized the material
released as incomparable in all of ‘ ”human history” (Bolton
2012)—at least human history up to that point in time. This is
a summary of the documents:
Afghan War Logs. In July, WikiLeaks posted some 91,000
US military reports dated between 2004 and 2009. These field
reports were composed by soldiers and intelligence officers and
pertained to topics such as the civilian casualties from NATO
forces and attacks against the Coalition by the Taliban. Wiki-This content downloaded from 144.173
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aLeaks initially collaborated with the newspaper the Guardian,
which then led to further collaborations with the New York
Times and Der Spiegel in both analyzing and publicizing the
material.
Iraq War Logs. In October 2010, some 400,000 US docu-
ments related to the war in Iraq were released, consisting of
daily Significant Activity Reports detailing the outcome of use
of force incidents. Again, this was done in collaboration with
the Guardian, the New York Times, and Der Spiegel.
Diplomatic cables. In November 2010, WikiLeaks posted a
subset of the 251,287 diplomatic cables sent by US embassies.
El País, Le Monde joined the Guardian, the New York Times,
and Der Spiegel in analyzing the documents, with additional
cables released in piecemeal fashion thereafter.
In this article, I sketch the ways claims were constructed on
the basis of these releases, through content reference to news
stories including the term “WikiLeaks” in the Guardian and
the New York Times, published during the period of July
2010–June 2011; official US statements on the 2010 leaks; and
a small number of other major investigative analyses.1 The
method employed was as follows: all of the news reports and
US official government statements pertaining to WikiLeaks
during these time periods were read to understand them as a
whole without preconceived categories. Through this quali-
tative review, the contrasting orientations to the definitiveness
and the accessibility of the meaning of the logs and cables was
determined to be a noteworthy theme. I then identified key
concepts and phrasing in the texts reviewed, associated with
the definitiveness of claims made about US statecraft. Through
an inductive process of reasoning, the examples of these con-
trasting wordings were organized into two general patterns of
discourse that are elaborated in this section and the next one.
In reading these news stories, one notable theme was how
participating media outlets repeatedly insisted that the leaked
documents opened up hidden areas of diplomacy and na-
tional security. The Guardian newspaper made fairly assured
arguments along these lines. The article “IraqWar Logs Reveal
15,000 Previously Unlisted Civilian Deaths” began by stating:
Leaked Pentagon files obtained by the Guardian contain
details of more than 100,000 people killed in Iraq following
the US-led invasion, including more than 15,000 deaths that
were previously unrecorded . . . The mass of leaked doc-
uments provides the first detailed tally by the US military of
Iraqi fatalities. Troops on the ground filed secret field re-
ports over six years of the occupation, purporting to tot up
every casualty, military and civilian. (Leigh 2010b)
The 15,000 unrecorded-deaths number in this quote re-
ferred to civilian deaths not previously identified through
the individual-by-individual tally of civilian deaths by Iraq
Body Count (2010)—a total largely derived through tallying up
deaths specified in English-language news accounts. Another.177.062 on January 03, 2019 01:49:20 AM
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Rappert Leaky Revelations S000article titled “WikiLeaks Iraq: Data Journalism Maps Every
Death” included these figures for deaths between 2004 and 2009:
Total deaths
• The database [of Significant Activity Reports] records
109,032 deaths in total for the period
• The database records the following death counts: 66,081
civilians, 23,984 insurgents and 15,196 Iraqi security
forces. (Rogers 2010b).
As part of the online version of the articles, readers could
download spreadsheet log details on “every death in Iraq.”
On the back of the quoted figures, in his book WikiLeaks and
the Age of Transparency, Micah Sifry (2011:34) contended
that the Iraq War Logs “revealed that the Pentagon had lied
about not keeping accurate records of the Iraqi death toll
from the war and that the casualty total was perhaps 15,000 per-
sons larger than the numbers previously made public.”
Likewise, at times, the diplomatic cables were said to en-
able an “unvarnished picture” of the decisions, motivations,
and duplicities of the government (New York Times 2010). In
contrast to such definitive critical condemnations of US policy
and practice, some political pundits and officials—such as for-
mer US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton—contended that the
cables clearly illustrated how little there was by way of misdeeds
or a split between the public face and backroom dealings of dip-
lomats (e.g., Rachman 2010; Zakaria 2010).
Whatever the evaluation, the leaked material was repeat-
edly attached with the qualities of sufficiency and literalness.
The thinking of officials and the deeds of security personnel
were recorded in the logs and cables, and these had come into
view. Treating them as such then enabled commentators to
debate questions such as, Did the logs and cables provide a
damning indictment of US activities or not? Did they say any-
thing new or not? It also set the stage for some of those involved
to represent the publication of the leaked material as another
round of the “eternal battle between those in power, with an
interest in controlling information, and the journalist and cit-
izen who wants it to be free” (Beckett and Ball 2012:91). In the
manner that comprehension followed from disclosure, one way
we can characterize the logs and cables is as “transparent” data:
this in the sense of “transparent” referring to what is manifest,
in plain sight, and easy to perceive. In the language of the field
of information theory (Floridi 2014), the releases were depicted
as having the status of “information,” that is, as well-formed,
meaningful, and truthful data. Commentators advanced posi-
tions (albeit ones offering opposing conclusions) in which the
leaks were portrayed as speaking for themselves rather than any
supplementary explanations and evidence being required.
With such a factual status, the leaked material could enable
seeing through the obfuscations of officialdom. For instance,
the record of a private diplomatic meeting given through the
cables (e.g., notes of meeting with the Kazakh ambassador to
Washington) was treated as a way to get “beyond the public
statements and official platitudes” (BBC Two 2012b). WhatThis content downloaded from 144.173
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms awas said in private (as revealed by the leaked material) served
as a basis for establishing what diplomats “really say behind
closed doors.” At times, then, an exceptional status was granted
to the leaked material, as if it provided a definitive view into
diplomats’ or others’ inner thoughts. Such an orientation also
came with assumptions about how statecraft works in prac-
tice. To maintain a distinction between commonplace public
appearances and private realities as revealed by the leaks as-
sumes that the kinds of “strategic interaction” (Goffman 1970)
associated with statecraft—the moves (and countermoves and
counter-countermoves) by individuals to influence each other
and manage self-images—effectively end in certain situations.
Whereas the public persona of an official can assume multiple
faces, the presumptionmadewas that once office doors are shut,
the real one emerges.2 Instead of understanding the cables as
records of conversations influenced by (i) the fears, priorities,
and perspectives of officials within a state, (ii) the demands of
the setting in which they were made, or (iii) the differential
power relations between states, they were taken as uncontrived.
In this way itmight be said, then, that in the stories, on occasion,
the leaked material was treated as more than just transparent.
Instead, we can characterize their treatment as one of being pris-
tine; that is to say that the information given could stand alone,
did not require other information to account for its meaning,
and could directly speak to what took place.
Beyond the Leaks
Contentions that the logs and cables put the facts out there
for all to view granted them a self-sufficiency, but such attri-
butions stood somewhat uncomfortably with the human voice
that presented them. Unless reports, investigators, and commen-
tators simply mouthed the words written in the logs and cables
in their reporting, then human agency—skill, judgment, inter-
pretation—mattered in how the leaks were assessed.
Scholars of discourse have long indicated how the place of
expertise is negotiated in relation to the immediacy, obvious-
ness, and accessibility of information (e.g., Cole 1998). For
instance, Gilbert and Mulkay (1984) examined how scientists
characterized claims to knowledge through the use of con-
trasting repertoires. In a so-called empiricist repertoire, scien-
tists’ claimswere presented as natural, self-evident outcomes of
careful study. Yet, this way of portraying science common in
professional publications mixed with a contingent repertoire
more prevalent in informal settings. In the contingent reper-
toire, “scientists presented their actions and beliefs as heavily
dependent on speculative insights, prior intellectual commit-
ments, personal characteristics, indescribable skills, social ties
and group membership” (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984:56). Gil-
bert and Mulkay argued that understanding how debates over
truth develop and eventually get settled (or not) required mind-
ing how such repertoires interrelate..177.062 on January 03, 2019 01:49:20 AM
nd Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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cursive orientations within the analysis of the logs and cables.
For example, a two-part television series,WikiLeaks: The Secret
Life of a Superpower (BBC Two 2012a, 2012b)—self-dubbed
“the first in-depth television analysis of the secret cables”—in-
cluded repeated and explicit claims proposing that the cables
spoke for themselves in the revelatory spirit of the previous
section. Thus it was said that “The cables reveal what American
diplomats say when they think the world will never know who
they trust and who theymock, what they want and how they get
it.” Over three dozen assertions were made that “The cables
showed,” “The cables revealed,” or “The cables allow us to see.”
In only a few instances were explicit qualifications of any sort
inserted, such as that “The cables seemed to suggest.”
And yet, despite the many references to the face-value mean-
ing of the cables inWikiLeaks: The Secret Life of a Superpower, at
times it also spoke to a not readily apparent meaning alongside
the apparent one. While much ground for criticism of US for-
eign policy was said to be evidenced bywhat the cables revealed,
the presenter also spoke of reasons for praise in the work of
officials:
The cables reveal aspects of US diplomacy that America did
not want us to see. But the real story of the cables is more
complicated. These secret documents show US diplomats
apparently trying to do good. In country after country, even
behind closed doors, they are raising issues like freedom,
democracy and human rights . . . And yet, the cables show
a real tension in US diplomacy. The US wants to spread its
ideals across the world, but struggles to reconcile this with its
other interests, like protecting some of its unsavory alliances.
(BBC Two 2012a; emphasis in delivery)
This third layer, the real story of struggle, was only made evi-
dent in the documentary through the in-depth analysis of the
cables, enabled by interviews and other forms of supplemen-
tary evidence. Within programs such asWikiLeaks: The Secret
Life of a Superpower, then, the leaked material both spoke the
truth and needed to be spoken for (see, as well, Khalili and
Smith 2010).
Relatedly, within the reports by the Guardian and the New
York Times as well as by members of WikiLeaks itself, the need
for “context” was sometimes said to be necessary to make sense
of the logs and cables.3 While an individual cable—indicating,
for instance, the shipment of missiles by North Korea to Iran—
might seem to have a definite significance at first sight, the sit-
uation could prove otherwise through the “wider window” en-
abled by further journalistic investigation and expertise (Mazzetti
and Broad 2010). Of course, verifying, identifying, contextual-
izing, and otherwise analyzing information are often regarded
as the hallmarks of journalism and the source of its authority.
What is noteworthy in the case ofWikiLeaks is that attention to3. For instance, in Baker (2010) and in comments made by Julian
Assange inMediastan (at 14:00). For analyses suggesting the importance of
context inWikiLeaks reporting, see Roberts (2012) and Coddington (2014).
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how the once-secret documents clearly told their own story.
In the ways the logs and cables had to be set aside in order
to get to what really took place, we can characterize them as
transparent in another (and opposing) sense of the term than
the one outlined in the second section. This sense of “trans-
parent” refers to what is to be “seen through.” In line with
Teurlings and Stauff ’s (2014) analysis of the making of trans-
parency, rather than providing some unmediated access to what
really took place, what the logs showed had to be made sense
of by intermediaries, individuals whose representations were
open to question.
As an additional dimension of the varied ways of making
sense of the leaked material, it is possible to identify two dif-
ferent senses of the leaks as raw data within the examined
media coverage, approaches that mirror longstanding cultural
categorical oppositions. They were treated as raw in the sense
of providing a graphic, unspun, and unadulterated (and thus
providing a highly insightful “raw look at US diplomacy” [e.g.,
Shane and Lehren 2010]). Here the cables could be drawn on
in a literal way for what they showed, since they were endowed
with authenticity by virtue of their status as leaked documents.
In contrast, though, they were also treated as raw in the sense
of being crude, rough, and unprocessed. On the day of the
Afghan War Diary release, for instance, the Guardian ran a
front-page story titled “Massive Leak of Secret Files Exposes
True AfghanWar.”This took the war logs as detailing “a blow-
by-blow account of the fighting.” Other stories by that news-
paper on that same day used the logs to provide an “unvar-
nished picture” of the conflict, yet also noted that the log
entries were poor quality, uncorroborated, incomplete, written
in a cryptic language, simply false, or subject to other caveats
(Guardian 2010; Leigh 2010a). Such deficiencies were not said
to render the logs completely useless. However, they did de-
mand additional skilled journalistic reporting to uncover which
facts they supported.
In the case of WikiLeaks, the tension over whether the leaked
material spoke the truth on its own also stemmed from there
being so much of it. The 2010 releases encompassed hundreds
of thousands of documents. There were data “in spades. With
bells on” (Rogers 2010a). As such, not only did the content of
the logs make the news in 2010, but sometimes so did the pro-
duction of the news stories from them. Processing this amount
of material was said by Guardian reporters to require noncon-
ventional skills associated with the then-emerging field of data
journalism (the acquisition, analysis, and presentation of large
data sets to support journalism), lest the sheer volume of it con-
found sense making.
The manner in which treatments of the logs and cables as ac-
cessible, evident, and definite mixed with treatments of them as
involving what was inaccessible, unappreciated, and indefinite
tied in with contentions about the distribution of epistemic com-
petencies. At times, for instance, the negotiation of expertise in
relation to data analysis moved between devolution and def-
erence. In the case of the Afghan War Diary, for instance, the.177.062 on January 03, 2019 01:49:20 AM
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set of 300 significant incidents and a set of the logs related to
improvised explosive devices. For both, a graphic interface was
produced to enable readers to call up individual logs. For those
that wanted to go a step further—“to download this data to play
with it yourself” (Rogers 2010a)—Excel spreadsheets were com-
piled. Thus, not only could readers see how the numbers of
improvised explosive device attacks per year and by location
have fluctuated, but they could conduct their own analysis.
Indeed, one report appealed to readers in asking, “Can you
help us make more sense of the raw info?’ (Rogers 2010a).
Offering a response to this question would seem tricky in re-
lation to the very terms in which it was reported. One reason
for this is that cross-checks done by reporters at the Guardian
and others on the Afghan logs were said (albeit in another
article) to indicate the wounded in action (WIA) and killed in
action (KIA) entries in the reports were “highly unreliable”
(Leigh 2010c). Such appraisals, especially without further de-
tails, frustrated knowing how to make sense of the logs as “raw
info.”4 In addition, as explicitly acknowledged, the logs that
were included within the data journalism resources at the
Guardian only represented a small portion of the overall leaked
documents. This made it problematic to situate specific inci-
dents within the “overall context” or “wider window” provided
by the totality of the releases. Thus while readers were asked to
make more sense of the “raw info,” they were also directed back
to reporters and data journalists who had been able to check,
identify, contextualize, and otherwise analyze the logs.
Other examples can be identified whereby what was pre-
sented as made available through the leaked material was si-
multaneously bound up with what was missing from it in ways
that seemingly unsettled what could be known. For instance,
the sense that the leaked material was “out there” and visible
for all to see took on a graphic form. The Guardian used the
Iraq military logs as a data set for geographically pinpointing
the location of fatalities in an online map as part of a news
story titled “WikiLeaks Iraq Logs: Every Death Mapped”
(Rogers 2010b). Two days after the initial publication of the
leaks, an American academic with existing access to log data
pointed to various practical limitations with how and when the
logs were filled in—considerations that were said by the Guard-
ian to lead to the underreporting of deaths (Rogers 2010c).5
Much more was at stake in the reporting of the figures than
the possibility of poor completion of the logs, though. Notably,
the logs only related to deaths directly resulting from violence
associated with armed intervention by the Multinational Force.
Indirectly, though, conflicts kill through denying or disturbing
access to health care, food, and clean water; by fueling criminal4. Despite such caveats, this data set has been treated as a “detailed
insider’s description of the military machinery of the world’s largest power,”
one taken as “a reliable description of the Afghan war” based on said “sys-
tematic verification efforts” at the New York Times. See Zammit-Mangion
et al. (2012:12416).
5. Underreporting was also noted elsewhere, as in Leigh (2010b).
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physical well-being. In terms of the total burden of armed con-
flict, direct deaths typically only represent a fraction of indirect
ones (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2008).
No mention was made of this distinction as part of the
Guardian Iraq War Logs coverage. The only allusion at the
time to the question of which deaths count as part of map-
ping “every death” was made through a brief reference in one
Guardian article. The total figure derived from the logs was
said to be “far lower than another widely quoted estimate of
more than 650,000 ‘excess deaths’ extrapolated on a different
basis and published in a 2006 study in the Lancet” (Leigh
2010b).6 No elaboration was given to the meaning of “excess
deaths.” What is noteworthy, though, is that this term refers
not to direct combat deaths but to the far more expansive
notion of how many more Iraqis in total had died (for what-
ever reason) than would have done so in the absence of the
2003 invasion.
After the launch of the Iraqi War Logs, the initial reports
from the newspapers collaborating with WikiLeaks would be
picked up elsewhere and translated into arguments about who
knew what and said what, the legitimacy of the invasion, and
total casualty figures (e.g., Burchell 2012; Hider 2012; White
2010). While some reports of the WikiLeaks Iraq War Logs
investigated in detail the methodological basis for disputes (e.g.,
Reynolds 2010), most gave such matters very little or no elab-
oration. Instead, glosses of the issues at hand were given using
(in this context) ambiguous terms such as “civilian deaths” or
“Iraqis.”
In noting the considerations of the previous three para-
graphs, it is possible to suggest how the terms used in ac-
counts of what was revealed through the logs set their own
trap door regarding what omissions lay within them—or at
least for those people able to bring forth a sense of what was
missing. Unless what is disclosed at any one point in time can
be taken as providing a (for all purposes) complete disclosure,
then questions can be asked about what is being left out and
how that affects the understanding of what was divulged. In
relation to the topic of civilian deaths in Iraq, it is difficult to
imagine what an “adequate” or “complete” disclosure could
be in light of the lack of shared or even specified purposes for
the death figures. Depending on whether they are meant to me-
morialize suffering of innocents, judge the morality of force,
establish assistance and reconstruction requirements, assess the
effectiveness of operations, or simply acknowledge loss, then
determinations about what should be said and with what detail
can easily diverge. Yet recognition of this purpose dependency
was not often aired in the 2010 news coverage of the WikiLeaks
Iraq War Logs (or, for that matter, in wider political disputes
about Iraqi deaths [Rappert 2012]).6. As opposed to the Iraq Body Count that tallied individual reports
of deaths, the Lancet study employed cluster statistical sampling tech-
niques coupled with a baseline morality rate to estimate how many more
Iraqis died than would have died in the absence of the war.
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The manner in which disclosure can create a sense of what has
been undisclosed as yet is underscored by the “stories behind
the stories” about WikiLeaks. Starting from 2011, these were
produced by those central to the 2010 revelations in books, doc-
umentaries, and films. For instance, Daniel Domscheit-Berg’s
Inside WikiLeaks invited readers into the “explosive exposé of
the inner workings of the whistle-blowing phenomenon.”7 In-
dividuals at the collaborating newspapers examined in this
article also came out with book-length volumes (WikiLeaks: In-
side Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy by David Leigh and Luke
Harding at the Guardian—hereafter, “WikiLeaks”—as well as
Open Secrets by the New York Times). A story behind the story
was then also presented in the documentary Mediastan as
well as the feature film Fifth Estate that drew on the books by
Domscheit-Berg as well as Leigh and Harding. These narratives
were in addition to other outputs with more or less direct col-
laboration with WikiLeaks members. This includes Laura Poi-
tras’s filmRisk. Another set of notable collaborative publications
included “Julian Assange’s” Julian Assange: The Unauthorised
Autobiography (2011) as well as its ghostwriters’ version of
the story behind this quasi-autobiography behind the story
(O’Hagan 2014).
In seeking to make previously undisclosed considerations
known, each story behind the story intertextually traded on
there having been something absent from previous coverage.
Much of this novelty related to the “texture, nuance, and drama”
(Keller 2011:18)—definitely drama—of personalities and events.
This included the cloak-and-dagger intrigue of the dealings
between newspaper organizations and Julian Assange, the per-
ception of power and paranoia that developed with the han-
dling of thousands upon thousands of classified documents,
the manner in which WikiLeaks as a fledgling organization
projected an inflated image of itself to the world, the practices
by which journalists both hoard and share data, the manner
in which WikiLeaks internally descended into a personality
cult, and so forth.
More relevant to the themes of this article, the inside stories
also unsettled the factual status of what had been claimed in
2010 by organizations collaborating in the release of the logs
and cables. For instance, accounts of the story of the leaks by
staff from the Guardian and the New York Times cited nu-
merous limitations to the logs and cables, arguably in a starker
and more extended manner than in their 2010 news reports.
The cables, for instance, were said not only to be subject to
qualification about their reliability but also to be restricted in
the overall picture they painted because “top secret” or higher-
classified cables were not in the set of documents WikiLeaks
obtained (Keller 2011:14). In addition, the cables’ authors were
deemed to have agendas—to impress others, to promote their
views, and to ensure their jobs—so that what was written
should not be taken at face value (Leigh andHarding 2011:143–7. From the back cover of Domscheit-Berg (2011).
This content downloaded from 144.173
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms a144). And yet, such failings mixed in a seemingly tension rid-
den way with the refrain also given in these stories behind the
stories that the cables themselves provided “an unprecedented
look at back-room bargaining by embassies around the world,
brutally candid views of foreign leaders and frank assessments
of nuclear and terrorist threats” (Shane and Lehren 2010:54).
Such problems also sat seemingly uneasily with the inclusion of
numerous reproduced cables for readers to pour over without
instruction, qualification, or context in WikiLeaks and Open
Secrets.
As another instance of how the inside stories unsettled
what had been made known previously, one of the Guardian’s
reporters (Simon Rogers) was quoted by colleagues in Wiki-
Leaks as stating in relation to the Afghan War Diary that, “In
future, data journalism may not seem amazing and new; for
now it is. The world has changed and it is data that has changed
it” (Leigh and Harding 2011:107). As the authors ofWikiLeaks
went on, “One obvious opportunity was to obtain genuine sta-
tistics of casualties for the first time. But to do so Rogers and his
reporter colleagues had to grapple with realities on the military
ground: those realities made apparently enticing datasets into
dirty and unreliable statistics” (107). This unreliability was the
result of realities such as the filling in of the logs by units to
varying degrees andmanners; the difficulties of counting deaths
in combat situations; and the belief that combatant death counts
were sometimes exaggerated and civilian ones intentionally
undercounted. As a result, the authors ofWikiLeaks then con-
tended:
So it was a tricky task to produce statistics that could be
claimed to have real value. That highlighted once again the
inescapable limitations of the purist WikiLeaks ideology.
The material that resided in leaked documents, no matter
how voluminous, was not “the truth.” It was just often a
signpost pointing to some truth, requiring careful attention.
(Leigh and Harding 2011:108)8
Just how statistics with real value could be produced from un-
reliable statistics by reporters was not elaborated in WikiLeaks,
though. WhatWikiLeaksmade even less certain was how read-
ers of theGuardian invited by SimonRogers to download Excel
spreadsheets back in 2010 (as noted above) could have ad-
vanced the state of knowledge given the limitations said to
be recognized at the time of the Afghan War Diary releases by
those at the newspaper.9
In certain respects, the stories behind the stories queried ex-
pertise in a way missing in 2010 news reports by the collabo-
rating organizations under scrutiny in this article. The promi-
nence in places attached to the journalistic role in making
sense of the leaked material—of what otherwise would be an
“incomprehensible mass data dump” (Leigh and Hardingtruth, including by Julian Assange, see Hermann and Moreira (2011).
9. For a later analysis by a collaborating partner, see Iraq Body Count
(2010).
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varying claims were drawn from the logs and cables. Bill Keller,
the former executive editor for theNew York Times, questioned
the Guardian’s coverage of civilian deaths in Afghanistan, in-
cluding whether logs proved that there were “hundreds of ci-
vilian deaths [from] unreported incidents” (Keller 2011:10).11
While such comments queried others’ reporting, largely
absent from the stories behind the stories were self-directed
concerns. This was perhaps most vivid in relation to Wiki-
Leaks. This book chronicled the newspaper’s initial engage-
ments, strained collaborations, and eventual estrangement from
Julian Assange and WikiLeaks. In addition to being the au-
thors of WikiLeaks, both David Leigh and Luke Harding
played significant but ambiguous roles in the unfolding events
retold. The book was written in a narrative third person format
where actions by these two reporter-authors were discussed
in just the same way as others in the “Cast of Characters” list
provided at the start of the book (Leigh and Harding 2011:vii).
The authors were even quoted (by themselves) in a journalistic
third person fashion as offering eyewitness accounts of what
happened. This narrative format was employed without atten-
tion towhat this “self-reporting reporting” implied for the status
and bounds of what was written in this story behind the stories.
Thus, while the stories behind the stories provided occa-
sions for reconsidering what the leaks made available, this
was done in circumscribed ways in relation to previous news
reports. This meant claims about the logs and cables could be
made anew without being encumbered by the need to square
them with what was written back in 2010 by the same indi-
viduals.
Openings
With its roots in Enlightenment ideals about the power of
information and the corrosiveness of secrecy, the leaking of
documents is one common strategy for exposing the maneu-
verings of statecraft. In this spirit, the 2010 releases by Wiki-
Leaks have been praised by some scholars for realizing the
virtuous goals of transparency (e.g., Pieterse 2012; Springer
et al. 2012). In contrast, by attending the varied claims made
on the back of the releases over time, this article has offered a
different appreciation. Rather than treating absence and pres-
ence, immediacy andmediacy, or disclosure and concealment as
opposite poles against which the leaks should be measured, I
have asked how claims to both aspects of the pairings got
packaged together in and between news reports, documentaries,
and biographies.
Related themes have been prevalent in other examinations
of disclosure and expertise. Kuntsman and Stein (2015) crit-
ically examined how social media have enabled militarism to
be rendered both visible and invisible. Central to this has been10. For a wider analysis of the limitations of the size of the data, see
Coddington (2014).
11. See also Leigh and Harding (2011:218).
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instantly available and yet banal. Wider than militarism itself,
Coopmans’s (2014) notion of “artful revelation” signaled the
manner in which the promotion of data visualization software
situationally traded on both the contention that this tool enabled
patterns in data to be brought into sight while also making
germane the need for skills, experience, and understanding to
interpret visual analytics which, in turn, put the realization of
real benefits of the software just out of the purview of would-be
users.
In a similar vein of elaborating how expectations, belief,
and skepticism come bundled together in what gets seen,
Smith (2015) charted the rise of “modern” forms of conjuring
entertainment magic in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries. Central to this type of magic was the shift away from elab-
orate stage props, dim lighting, and other devices that signaled
the likely basis for deceptive effects—a move demanded by the
increasing scientific sophistication of audiences. In its place,
a naturalistic and realistic pretense emerged in which the appa-
ratuses, props, and costumes for magic were presented as simple,
ordinary, and minimalistic. Through this, audiences to acts un-
derstood as deceptive became engrossed, but not only because
the methods and mechanisms of trickery were concealed from
their sight. A second-order concealment took place whereby
spectators were made “confident that they had seen all they
needed to see” (Smith 2015:325) about the apparatuses, props,
and costumes being used due to their simplicity. Thus, what was
striven for by magicians was the production of “empty boxes” in
which secret mechanisms were both rendered absent and seen
to be absent.
Such studies suggest the importance of attending to the pat-
tern of discursive and other movements that constitute efforts
to makematters known as well as the basis for the affective pull
of what is (not) shown. By way of undertaking this exercise in
the case of WikiLeaks—and thereby informing a more general
understanding of how secrecy, revelation, and openness can be
bound together in understanding militarism—I will offer an
alternative box analogy. This one speaks to how the promise of
what the logs and cables might offer was able to be reconsti-
tuted through prior claims made about what they revealed.
At one level, collaborating organizations widely presented
the leaking of the logs and cables as efforts to open the lid on
a hidden world. With such a container metaphor for the truth
(as in Lakoff and Johnson 1980), revealing is a matter of trying
to pry open what was previously locked away. As suggested in
the third and fourth sections, though, in important respects the
cables and logs on their own were also treated as varyingly
insufficient—at least at times. This insufficiency demanded
something further—additional skill, investigation, context,
etc.—and this meant that finding out the truth was presented
as more or less possible, more or less successfully accom-
plished, and so on.
Overall, then, the logs and cables were treated in multiple
and seemingly tension-ridden ways vis-à-vis what their dis-
closure had made available. And yet, such varying treatment.177.062 on January 03, 2019 01:49:20 AM
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egories for orientating to the releases given in the previous
sections stemmed from the movements undertaken within the
terms associated with a container framing. The potential for
shifting between opposing senses of “transparent” (manifest vs.
see-through) or “raw” (graphic vs. crude) pertained to the vary-
ing evaluations made regarding what was revealed in opening
the box of statecraft.
The “stories behind the stories” provided a set of occasions for
making claims about what had been made available through
the logs and cables. They did so by going beyond the stories
written in 2010—stories by the same authors as well as others.
Yet, the “stories behind the stories” did so with little ques-
tioning or critical appraisal of what the same individuals or
organizations had said previously. In other words, while trad-
ing on a notion of a past that needed to be revisited in order to
be gone beyond, they were selectively coupled to previous his-
tories of that past. This enabled authors to forward claims
without needing to address how they conflicted with prior
claims.
This overall situation—one in which arguments about the
latest dramatic disclosure were produced by going farther
than the bounds of what had been written before, but with
circumscribed attention to what had been written before—
provided the circumstances in which the story of WikiLeaks
could be revisited over time. These representations enabled
reinterpretations of meaning. They also revived the notion
that there were figurative boxes that had been pried open for
what they made present and, importantly, could be pried
opened farther at some later point in time. In the manner one
disclosure provided the starting bases for a next one, the pro-
cess of revealing could be characterized as self-enabled. Indeed,
in some respects, the more one knows about what had been
said in previous WikiLeaks analyses, the more entry points for
re-revelations exist.
An analogy that speaks to the dynamics above is that of a
series of nested Chinese boxes. What was disclosed in one ac-
count of the logs and cables at a given point in time provided the
basis for unpacking past claims in ways that varied from sug-
gesting the leaks really did and actually did not reveal what
took place. What was disclosed at a given point also served as a
resource for what could be reopened later because previous
knowledge claims provided the working boundaries for subse-
quent reinterpretations.
Discussion
The concealment of information is often central to milita-
ristic activities. Given the consequences of the use of force as
well as the maintenance of military might, the stakes asso-
ciated with secret keeping are considerable. As developed
elsewhere in this issue (as in the articles by Weiss [2019] and
Gusterson [2019]), efforts to bring to light sequestered events
and documents can be important in holding organizations to
account.This content downloaded from 144.173
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms aThis article has attended to a prior set of issues than those
centered on the usefulness of leaked documents, namely, how
leaks get positioned as making understanding available. More
than just a debate about what should be on display, this anal-
ysis has entailed posing questions about what had been put on
display. I have suggested how the standing of the documents
was subject to much negotiation in practice, even sometimes
within accounts that otherwise prominently contended that
they provided a graphic, unspun, and insightful window into
statecraft. In making sense of the logs and cables, commen-
tators forwarded notions of what was missing from our un-
derstanding of the world, what wasmissing or lacking from the
leaked material, and what was missing or lacking from the
coverage of it.
In contrast to settling what the logs and cables really told
us, this article has asked how appeals to varieties of expertise
accompanied and accomplished the interpretations of the
leaks. While thereby calling into question the relatively nar-
row matter of the potential of these specific leaked documents
to speak the truth, the argument has opened the far more ex-
pansive concern of how expertise and authority are consti-
tuted as part of making claims about statecraft. This recogni-
tion of contingency therefore offers the prospect that expertise
can be remade. This is important because claims about what
the leaked material showed laid the foundations for arguments
about what modern statecraft is like and thereby the prospects
for change. Claims about what the leaked material could show
likewise posited who could define those realities and possibili-
ties.
Another related implication of the analysis is to draw atten-
tion to how themystique surrounding knowledge of statecraft is
perpetuated through leaking. The Latin root for the English
word “secret,” secretus, means “to separate” or “set apart.”Those
in positions of authority in the state and elsewhere often seek to
set themselves apart from others through noting their access to
information, and so effect a form ofmystification (see the article
by Lutz in this issue [2019]). As a supplement to such lessons,
this argument has suggested how mystification can be repro-
duced by those striving to expose militarism.
Thus, when seeking to reckon with militarism, it is impor-
tant not only to attend to the assumptions guiding its practices
but the assumptions guiding scholarly, professional, and pop-
ular analyses of it. Stated in general terms, a pitfall is how what
is revealed—often by virtue of having been revealed—can take
on solidity. When gripped too tightly, though, the potential for
learning and insight can turn into a stultifying fixation. The
treatment of certain information as unassailable goes hand
in hand with the refutation of other possibilities, the closing
down of inquiry, the carpeting over of inconsistencies, and
the formation of hegemonic thinking. In short, seeking to
grab hold can result in a slipping away.
The fixations I am alluding to relate not only towhat has been
grasped but also to the compulsion to grasp. As noted above,
and echoing themes from elsewhere (Daston and Galison 2007;
Hadot 2008), attempts at revealing the truth of statecraft often.177.062 on January 03, 2019 01:49:20 AM
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(see, as well, Nelson [2009]). The need to open a closed box, to
get beneath the surface, or to “bring out into the light” hidden
workings of the state are infusedwith expectations, investments,
and affects. We pull toward what has been, or is being, revealed.
That pull can make us insensitive to the assumptions that drive
our seeking. As a result, just as militarism comes with gross and
subtle commitments that need to be scrutinized, so too do at-
tempts to reveal its inner workings. In attending to the dynam-
ics of how leaked material gets positioned, this article supports
the case that contending with the colonizing aspects of milita-
rism requires not only investigation of the premises of milita-
ristic projects but also inquiry into the premises guiding our
endeavors.
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